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  Introduction 
Once named “wizard war” by Winston Churchill, the Second World War was a critical event in the 
shaping of the world. At the time, Churchill referred to the influence of new science and technology, 
but as Ferenc Morton Szasz justly points out, the real ‘wizards’ of the war operated in the field that 
influenced people’s hearts and minds: the field of propaganda.1  Propaganda exists in many shapes 
and sizes: pamphlets, stories in newspapers and magazines, film, leaflets or speeches on the radio. 
Around the world, this type of psychological warfare has been used to convince the enemy that their 
cause is lost and the home front that they are on the winning side. For example, Nazi-Germany would 
show their great victories in the news while the United States would show their own victories and 
depict Nazis (justly) as monsters.  
The same was the case in Southeast Asia during the Asia-Pacific War, where Japan propagated a Great 
East Asian Co-Prosperity Sphere. For this thesis I will examine Japanese propaganda from during the 
Japanese occupation of the Netherlands-Indies, that I will call Indonesia from now on. After a long 
period of Dutch colonial rule in the archipelago, the Japanese military came to take over Java on 
March 1942 and begin their military occupation. This lasted until August 1945 and eventually resulted 
in surrender by the Japanese. Although at first the Indonesians were happy to welcome them as 
‘liberators of Asia’ at their arrival, even happier they were at their departure. The period leading from 
the beginning of the occupation up to august 1945 was one full of exploitation, violence and 
humiliation, but at the same time it was also a period in which the Indonesian identity and nationalist 
sentiment were shaped and developed, partly through propaganda. Ultimately it contributed to 
Indonesia’s independence from the Dutch in 1949.  
The Dutch colonialists’ civilizing mission, the so called ‘Ethical Policy,’ had established a foundation for 
Indonesian elites through educational programs, providing them with “intellectual weapons” to voice 
resistance against their occupiers.2 The Dutch were, however, successful at restraining nationalist 
sentiment.3 They also considered the possibility, that Indonesian nationalists would form a serious 
movement that would be able to unify the diversified population of the archipelago and at the same 
time able to defend themselves from the Dutch military forces, to be small. When the Japanese 
military arrived, however, the Indonesians got the opportunity and space to spread their ideas, even 
though it was regulated. Frans Nieuwenhof cites a document in relation to the Japanese propaganda 
policy that confirms this:  
“The freedom of expression of the natives in the political field should be respected as 
much as possible. Economic hardship that was expected to appear should be 
mitigated to the best ability, and the political measures to be taken should in no case 
weaken their hope for the future. Therefore the existing rights of the natives to 
participate in the government should be extended. Native leaders should be 
appointed in important posts, thereby stimulating the hope and enthusiasm of the 
natives.” 4 
                                                            
1 F. M. Szasz, “’Pamphlet’s Away:’ the Allied Propaganda Campaign over Japan During the Last Months of World  
    War II,” p. 530 
2 A. Vandenbosch, “Nationalism in Netherlands East India,” Pacific Affairs. 4(12), p. 1053  
3 A. Vickers, A History of Modern Indonesia, p.85 
4 F. Nieuwenhof, “Japanese Film Propaganda in World War II: Indonesia and Australia,” p. 162 
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Additionally, the opportunity to get military training and weapons to fight for independence were 
introduced and nationalist leaders like Sukarno were given an audience, as will be discussed below.5  
To successfully acquire human and natural resources, which was in essence the purpose of the 
occupation, the cooperation of the entire population was needed. In order to achieve this cooperation, 
the Japanese occupiers planned to create various kinds of propaganda and use this as a means to 
make the society cooperate with the Japanese war effort. The General Headquarters of the Japanese 
army stated that both military and ideological fighting were equally important. Ideological fighting was 
deemed especially important to infiltrate among inhabitants in occupied areas, making propaganda an 
essential part of the occupation. 6 For this thesis I will be looking at different formats of propaganda 
media like newspapers, leaflets, posters and film from this period through both primary and secondary 
sources, in which signs of Indonesian identity and/or nationalist sentiment are visible. My overall aim 
is to show the relevance of propaganda in the shaping and developing of national identity and 
sentiment in Indonesia during the Japanese occupation.7  
 
According to H.A.J. Klooster, in Indonesia literature was the tool for conveying nationalist sentiment.8 
Additionally, Benedict Anderson writes in his book Imagined Communities that commercial print and 
mass literacy contribute to the feeling of being part of an imagined community through shared 
experiences that are shown in media, contrary to local or personal relationships.  
Furthermore, in her PhD dissertation Maxine Rockwell argues that the development of nationalist 
movements was progressing very slowly in Indonesia. The reasons for this, according to her, were 
among others a lack of a shared cultural past (of any significance), the difficulty of uniting peoples 
from widely separated islands with different cultural developments into one common movement, and 
the presence of large non-indigenous population groups blocking progress of Indonesia and 
supporting Dutch rule.9 As this thesis will show, the Japanese propaganda media responded to these 
aspects in the sense that they depicted Indonesia united as one nation with one people and the West 
(including the Dutch) as one common enemy. Taking all this into account, one could say that the 
media contributed to a sense of national consciousness. My overall aim is, on that account, to show 
the relevance of media in the shaping and developing of a national consciousness in Indonesia during 
the Japanese occupation.  
Since the Indonesian archipelago is quite a large area to cover, my plan was initially to focus my 
research on Java, Sumatra and Celebes for the following reasons; the Japanese divided the archipelago 
into three administrative areas (which means there were actually three occupations going on, 
according to Kanahele) of which the aforementioned areas are good representatives. 10 However, 
since the most data is available from the Java region, where the nationalist movement supposedly was 
                                                            
5 A. Vickers, A History of Modern Indonesia, p.84-94 
6 K. M. de Silva et al, Asian Panorama: Essays in Asian History, Past and Present, p. 486 
7 M. Rockwell, “A Survey of Japanese Propaganda to the Netherlands East Indies during World War II,” p. 23 
8 H.A.J. Klooster, Indonesiërs schrijven hun Geschiedenis: de Ontwikkeling van de Indonesische 
Geschiedbeoefening    
   in Theorie en Praktijk, 1900-1980, p. 4-5 
9 M. Rockwell, “A Survey of Japanese Propaganda to the Netherlands East Indies during World War II,” p. 20 
10 G. Kanahele, “The Japanese Occupation of Indonesia: Prelude to Independence,” p. iii  
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the most fervent and autonomous, in part due to Japanese mobilization campaigns through 
cooperation with nationalists,11 the main focus of this thesis will be here.  
There are several questions that I will keep in mind while doing this research: how is it possible that all 
of the archipelago’s areas became one, even though they were so fragmented?  How could a national 
identity created in this fragmented archipelago, which is incredibly diverse in terms of environment 
and culture? How big was the role the Japanese played in the creation of an Indonesian national 
identity, if they had a role in this? How do media contribute to a sense of national unity? Ultimately, 
the main question that I am aiming to answer in this thesis is “Did the propaganda media contribute to 
shaping and developing a certain Indonesian identity and a national consciousness during the 
Japanese occupation of Indonesia?” To answer this final question, I will analyze different kinds of 
media that have possibly contributed to the shaping and developing of a national identity and in 
particular visual media, because my knowledge of the Indonesian language is limited. I will incorporate 
and build on information from my own preliminary research papers as well and will I use visual 
material from the Nederlands Instituut voor Oorlogs-, Holocaust- en Genocidestudies and the 
Nederlands Instituut voor Beeld en Geluid . 
Already in the 1930s there were several hundred thousand readers of nationalist-inclined newspapers 
in Indonesia12 and novelists contributed to a national language/body of literature which is part of a 
national consciousness.13 Here I will examine Indonesian-language newspaper Asia Raya and the 
Japanese- and Indonesian-language Djawa Baroe magazine. The Djawa Baroe and Asia Raya were 
controlled by the sendenbu, a propaganda division within the military government. This was a group of 
writers and intellectuals, set up to better integrate the Indonesian society and introduce them to 
Japanese ideology. The sendenbu included both Japanese and native people in management and 
publication; Indonesians who had been active in anti-Dutch movements for example. Contrary to the 
sendenhan that was in charge of propaganda and information concerning military operations, the 
sendenbu was concerned with propaganda aimed at civilians. Because the literacy among the 
Indonesian people was quite low due to poor education,14 it is important to keep in mind that through 
images, movies and theatre a much bigger audience could be captured than through textual sources 
only. The Japanese were also aware of this fact and made use of visual media like posters and movies 
as well, in favor of their own regime, which is also why visual media is the main focus of this thesis. 
Quite some scholars have contributed greatly to the topic of Japanese propaganda in Indonesia. 
However, the existing research is usually confined to one particular medium. Aiko Kurasawa, for 
example, wrote a lot on film propaganda on Java and Rei Okamoto focused mainly on comics in his 
work. If various propaganda media are discussed, such as in the work of Shigeru Satō it is not always 
discussed in connection with the influence on nationalist consciousness. This thesis, by contrast, 
attempts to explain the influence that Japanese propaganda in various media had in developing a 
national consciousness in Indonesia. This will be done through an introduction about the occupation 
of Indonesia in general and three subsections: first I will explain what the propaganda division is, 
language barriers that existed and propaganda through audiovisual and radio. Next print media, 
                                                            
11 S. Satō, War, Nationalism and Peasants: Java under the Japanese Occupation 1942-1945, p. 36 
12 A. Reid, A History of Southeast Asia, Critical Crossroads, p. 420 
13 H. Sutherland, “Pudjangga Baru: Aspects of Indonesian Intellectual Life in the 1930s,” p. 106-112 
14 A. Reid, A History of Southeast Asia, Critical Crossroads p. 420 
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common enemy propaganda and the reinforcement of national identity will be discussed. Finally I will 
discuss the relation between the propaganda division and nationalist movements. 
The Invasion  
When in September 1939 World War II broke out in Europe, Japan had already suffered huge 
economic losses due to the global depression in the 1930s. The Dutch authorities in Indonesia had 
introduced defensive trade restrictions towards Japan, which caused a decline in Japanese sales.15 The 
embargo that the United States placed on petroleum and iron in 1941 added to the desperation of 
Japan, forcing it to seek to replace such sources for their war effort.16 Because of the losses of lives in 
the Sino-Japanese war, Japan was not only in need for economic resources; human resources were 
declining as well.17 Already before the war Indonesia was seen as a potential target for attaining 
human and material resources, but now that the Pacific War had begun Indonesia became an 
increasingly important object of attention in order to preserve peace and order, secure vital resources 
and local self-sustenance in Japan. This had to be achieved even at the cost of deprivation of the local 
people, according to Ishii Akiho, the colonel who contributed to this policy.18  
In order to still get their hands on the much needed resources, the Japanese were preparing to invade 
the areas south of Japan. By doing so they took advantage of the situation, since the Western colonial 
powers originally occupying these areas were now busy fighting in the Second World War.19 Before 
these invasions took place, the Japanese and Indonesian Minister of Foreign Affairs began trade 
negotiations mainly concerning oil export to Japan, which was of extreme importance to the Japanese 
government. Aside from securing oil supplies, another goal of the Japanese was to put Indonesia 
under Japan’s political hegemony and in this way form a self-sufficient area. The policy regarding this 
goal, dating from the 25th of October, 1940, read in part 
“For these purposes, policies shall be implemented according to the following points: 
1. To dissolve the current situation of the Netherlands Indies’ dependence on the 
Euro-American economic block and make it part of the Greater East Asian economy 
[…] 
3. To propose to the Netherlands Indies co-operative development of resources in 
order to secure important resources which the empire needs from within the sphere 
of Greater East Asia, and thus to become independent, resource wise, from the 
United States and Britain as soon as possible.” 
After several months of fruitless trade negotiations between the Japanese government and Indonesia, 
the Japanese Minister of Foreign Affairs reacted with this idea of a ‘Great East Asia Co-Prosperity 
Sphere,’ combining the Japanese interests and Southeast Asia’s various movements for 
independence.20 After Japan’s proposed hegemony was not acknowledged by Indonesia’s minister of 
                                                            
15 S. Satō, War, Nationalism and Peasants: Java under the Japanese Occupation 1942-1945, p. 4-5 
16 F. Nieuwenhof, “Japanese Film Propaganda in World War II: Indonesia and Australia,” p. 161 
17 T. Fujitani, “Right to Kill, Right to Make Live: Koreans as Japanese and Japanese as Americans during WWII,”  
    p. 14 
18 G. Kenichi, “Modern Japan and Indonesia; the Dynamics and Legacy of Wartime Rule,” p. 547 
19 S. Satō, War, Nationalism and Peasants: Java under the Japanese Occupation 1942-1945, p. 4-5 
20 F. Nieuwenhof, “Japanese Film Propaganda in World War II: Indonesia and Australia,” p. 162 
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commerce and the U.S. ceased oil exports to Japan, the invasion of Japan’s 16th Army in Java followed 
in March 1942.21  
  The Occupation 
As stated in the introduction, the Japanese authorities believed that the ideological fight was 
especially important to gain cooperation from the people of Indonesia. Therefore propaganda was a 
crucial part of the occupation. The message that the Japanese used to attract people’s attention was 
that they were the ‘liberators of Asia,’ here to free them from the Western colonialists and to 
establish a Greater East Asian Co-Prosperity Sphere consisting of East & Southeast Asia that would be 
led by Japan, the ‘big brother’ as they would call themselves.22 In order to achieve this goal, the 
propaganda suggested that it was crucial that Japan would win the war: if this would not be the case, 
Indonesia would become a colony of the Dutch again. The fate of Indonesia was therefore portrayed 
as if it depended on that of the Japanese.23  
Soetan Sjahrir, the first Indonesian to become a Prime Minister, observed that the whole Islamic 
population of Indonesia was pro-Japanese and that Japan was continually increasing in popularity – 
even in more remote areas – contrary to the Dutch who were increasingly seen as incompetent 
leaders. He wrote that this response can be explained as (understandable) hatred towards the Dutch 
colonialists, political opportunism (nationalist eagerness to work together with the Japanese 
authorities, hoping for better chances than they had with the Dutch) or some another forms of 
manifestations of nationalism.24   
Among the Japanese occupiers were people who could be called ethici, or ‘missionaries,’ who were 
trying to bring the old Asian values and the ‘Japanese spirit’ to Indonesia. This group of missionaries 
consisted of writers, media specialists and intelligence operatives. Their task was to convince the 
Indonesian population of Japan’s mission to create a ‘Greater Asia, ’ by winning the war and thereby 
liberating Asia from the Western and colonial oppression. Then they would be able to create a 
harmonious and thriving new order by combining Western science, technology and progress with 
Eastern values of morality, spirituality and community. The missionaries conveyed the message that 
winning the war and creating a ‘Greater Asia,’ was only possible through the exploitation of resources 
such as petroleum, food and manpower. To get these resources, local cooperation had to be 
ensured.25   
According to Anthony Reid, the Japanese occupation could in this sense be called idealistic. He gives 
an example of young Japanese teachers that were sent to the south to open new schools and 
institutes. They were inclined to believe that the Indonesian people were very much like the Japanese, 
but they were only lacking in morality because of the failing Dutch system before them.  Reid wrote 
that one headmaster told his students that “they were not brought here to enjoy themselves but to 
teach the Japanese seishin26[…] discipline and hard work[ …] and the laziness [the westerners] have 
                                                            
21 S. Satō, War, Nationalism and Peasants: Java under the Japanese Occupation 1942-1945, p. 7-8 
22 K. Mori & K. Hirano, A New East Asia: Toward a Regional Community, p. 29 
23 K. M. de Silva et al, Asian Panorama: Essays in Asian History, Past and Present, p. 486-487 
24 G. Kanahele, “The Japanese Occupation of Indonesia: Prelude to Independence,” p. 1 
25 E. Mark, “Appealing to Asia: Nation, Culture and the Problem of Imperial Modernity in Japanese-occupied  
    Java, 1942-1945,” p. 2-3 
26 Seishin精神 referring to “the Japanese spirit and mentalitiy”  
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taught you for hundreds of years is going to be wiped out.” These teachers aimed at the ‘Japanization’ 
of the Indonesian people by conveying Asian values, but instead – or at the same time – it could be 
said that they were busy creating a new identity.27  
Kurasawa shines a light on the old Asian values in Asian Panorama. One important aspect of these 
values and the Japanese spirit is discipline. She adds that this value was especially emphasized in a 
military context. Next, Kurasawa names simple life, economy in expenditure and self-sacrifice. Because 
the population was becoming poorer and poorer, ‘simple life’ and ‘economy in expenditure’ as values 
were used to make the people ‘accept’ living in poverty, Kurasawa explains. An example she gives is 
the encouraging of saving money, to reduce food consumption. Self-sacrifice (suicide) for the nation 
was very much respected and seen as sacred (an example of this is the Barisan Berani Mati – Suicide 
Corps). Another value that was promoted was diligence: one of the main reasons the Japanese came 
to Indonesia was for human resources and therefore people were encouraged to work hard.28  This is 
shown in figures 1 and 2. Figure 1 shows a ship in the making, with an accompanying text saying that 
building ships is for the benefit of defending Greater Asia, encouraging the audience to enroll in craft 
school. Figure 2 connects to this with a song. The lyrics tell the audience to “swing axes, wield 
hammers, to build boats – the guards of the sea.”  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                            
27 A. Reid, “Indonesia: From Briefcase to Samurai Sword,” in Southeast Asia under Japanese Occupation, ed.    
     Alfred W. McCoy, p. 23-24 
28 K. M. de Silva et al, Asian Panorama: Essays in Asian History, Past and Present, p. 487-488 
Figure 1 - “Bikin Kapal” building ships for Greater 
Asia, by Nederlands Instituut voor Oorlogs-, 
Holocaust- en Genocidestudies 
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In reality, more emphasis was put on practical themes with a concrete goal in propaganda activities, 
than on ideological and moral themes – Kurasawa suggests that it might be because of the fact that 
Indonesians did not like ‘Japanization,’ and they did not like being merged into the Great East Asian 
culture sphere. They did not really believe in the ‘common race, common ancestor’ cultural affinity, 
that Japan wanted to promote. When the Japanese authorities realized this, they gradually switched 
their propaganda policy to social-economic needs such as figure 1 and 2.29  
However important this thought-war was to the Japanese, in the end it might have been even more 
important for the people of Indonesia, who now got a chance to voice themselves. Indonesian 
playwright and fiction writer Anjar Asmara, who was part of a Greater East Asian Culture Association, 
who has written the following at the dawn of the occupation:  
 “Japan [...] recognizes itself as an older brother that will lead Indonesia in 
building its culture as a weapon to strengthen the spirit of Asia Raya”  
 “Because we are aware of the greatness and nobility of the aspiration for Asia 
Raya, we proclaim: let us begin with local culture. This is the first step. Teach each 
race to be true to its own culture […] It is our hope and conviction that our culture will 
be shaped first among ourselves, so that we might at a future date seek a way of 
steering it towards the culture of Asia Raya” 30 
Additionally, a schoolteacher, Djawoto, observed that the Japanese arrival alone had a big impact on 
Indonesian consciousness. He wrote that people were so impressed by Japanese sacrifice and what it 
had accomplished, that they were very enthusiastic to “join in shaping the social agenda:” popular 
astonishment at Japanese success had to be used to achieve the same kind of unity in Indonesia.31 
These statements are good examples of the hope and the chance that was given to Indonesia in 
expressing their culture and identity, even though they coincided with realistic concerns that these 
expressions might be limited.  
 
                                                            
29 A. Kurasawa, “Propaganda Media on Java under the Japanese 1942-1945,” p. 91 
30 E. Mark, “Appealing to Asia: Nation, Culture and the Problem of Imperial Modernity,” p. 289-291 
31 Ibid, p. 286 
Figure 2 - “Bikin Kapal” song, by Asia Raya (27th May, 1944) 
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  The Propaganda Division  
Propaganda was considered to be one of the most important tasks of the Japanese military: it was a 
tool for conveying ‘Asian values’ in order to win support for a Greater Asia and acquiring human and 
natural resources. Propaganda affairs were managed by a department within the military government, 
called sendenbu. The sendenbu was in charge of propaganda and information aimed at the people of 
Java, where they had their base. Certain activities were also organized by Indonesian natives instead of 
Japanese, but the control was never fully trusted to their hands. Within the sendenbu were specialized 
departments with different functions; there were departments for publishing newspapers, reporting, 
domestic broadcasting, producing movies and distributing movies. Furthermore, there was another 
organization that was concerned with the promotion of traditional Indonesian arts, introducing 
Japanese culture and educating and training Indonesian artists. In this organization Indonesian 
specialists worked full-time and Japanese instructors would train them.32 Lastly there was a special 
unit for the expansion of the propaganda network, called the District Operation Unit.33  
This subsection will discuss the challenges that the propaganda division encountered language-wise 
and how this problem was potentially beneficial for Indonesian nationalists. Subsequently this part will 
discuss two of the most important ways for the propaganda division to convey propaganda to a big 
audience: through audiovisual material and through radio.  
Language 
The Dutch, as former colonialists, played an important role in developing a national language. The 
Dutch education system favored indigenous languages but used one particular language – Malay 
(similar to bahasa Indonesia)34 – as main language so everyone in school had to speak Malay even if it 
was not their own language.35 The same goes for press and literature, causing Malay to become the 
national language of Indonesia due to systematic promotion by the colonial state and its consequent 
emergence.36 In this way, people from all over the archipelago would feel part of an imagined 
community, because they all had to speak and read the same language.37 In higher schools lectures 
were normally in Dutch.38  
In 1942, the Japanese abolished the Dutch language and made Indonesian (bahasa Indonesia) and 
Japanese the official languages but instead of referring to the Indonesian language Japanese 
administrators would refer to it as the Malay language.39 The fact that the Japanese used Indonesian 
as a language too, can in part be explained with the words of Japanese journalist Ichiki Tatsuo40 (who 
would later renounce his nationality and become an Indonesian independence fighter):41 
                                                            
32 Jawa Gunseikanbu, Jawa Nenkan 1944, p. 167-168 & Djawa Baroe no. 8, p. 8-10 
33 A. Kurasawa, “Propaganda Media on Java under the Japanese Occupation 1942-1945,” p. 59-61 
34 F. Dhont, “Outlasting Colonialism: Socio-Political Change in the Javanese Principalities under the Japanese  
    Occupation of Indonesia during World War II,” p. 85 
35 D. Henley, “The Origins of Southeast Asian Nations: A Question of Timing,” p. 270 
36 Ibid. p. 269-272 
37 Ibid. p. 269-272 
38 E. Mark, “Appealing to Asia: Nation, Culture and the Problem of Imperial Modernity in Japanese-occupied  
    Java, 1942-1945,” p. 535 
39 Ibid, 251 
40 Ibid, p. 350-351 
41 K. Goto, Tensions of Empire: Japan and Southeast Asia in the Colonial and Postcolonial World, p. 196-209 
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“After the imperial army had conquered Java, there were people around who 
argued that the words “Indonesian [language]” and “Indonesian race” should be 
eradicated. I always disagreed, and I complained […] that these sorts of opinions were 
no more than shallow, myopic nonsense. […] In order for Japanese to penetrate 
completely, it is necessary that we aim for the maintenance of the Indonesian 
language as its platform. Moreover, it is precisely the Indonesian language, which 
now advances in Java, that must serve as the future standard language not only in the 
former territories of the East Indies, but also within the broader Indonesian sphere 
identified both in geography and anthropology.”42 
In the Jakarta Medical College, to name one organization, Dutch instructors were replaced by doctors 
born in Indonesia. The senior teaching and administrative staff of this college were, on the other hand, 
Japanese. Therefore classes were now often in Japanese, as were the textbooks, and the students had 
to attend classes on Japanese language and culture too.43 Combined with the daily obligatory singing 
of the Japanese anthem, bowing towards the imperial palace and saluting the Japanese flag, this 
caused for a lot of discontent among students.44  
The insistence that the Japanese language had to replace Dutch in higher schools as well as in 
governmental administration evoked negative reactions,45 since there were almost no Indonesians 
who were familiar with Japanese.46 Likewise, as shown in figure 3 and 4, the Indonesian newspaper 
Asia Raya and magazine Djawa Baroe both frequently published Japanese language lessons, and the 
Indonesian articles in Djawa Baroe were paralleled by Japanese translation too. Even the radio would 
broadcast lessons in Japanese for both adults and children.47 Furthermore the text in figure 5 
encourages adults and children alike to read the ジャワシンブン (Djawa Shimbun) in Japanese 
because ‘bahasa nippon, bahasa timoer asia raja’ (the Japanese language is the language of Great 
East-Asia). The idea of these lessons was that, “so long as there are no Indonesians who can speak 
Japanese, then relations between Japan and Indonesia will always remain difficult.” 48  
Indonesian journalists, however, suddenly enjoyed greater prominence than they ever did before. 
They were now able to exercise some influence through the press. It is true that newspapers were 
censored by Japanese authorities, but so few Japanese were able to understand Indonesian that many 
journalists had to exercise self-censorship.49 As will be discussed in more detail below, the Japanese 
authorities were eager to offer nationalists jobs instead of leaving space for them to possibly create 
underground activities or movements out of discontent. Oto Iskandar di Nata, Soekardjo Wirjopranoto 
(who would be director or the Asia Raya newspaper) and many others were therefore offered 
positions in the press, radio and propaganda field, since mass communication was of top priority.  
                                                            
42 E. Mark, “Appealing to Asia: Nation, Culture and the Problem of Imperial Modernity in Japanese-occupied  
    Java, 1942-1945,” p. 350-351 
43 Ibid, p. 535-536 
44 Ibid, p. 536 
45 G. McTurnan Kahin, Nationalism and Revolution in Indonesia, p. 104 
46 H. Benda, “The Beginnings of the Japanese Occupation of Java” p. 543 
47 A. Kurasawa, “Propaganda Media on Java under the Japanese 1942-1945,” p. 87-88 
48 E. Mark, “Appealing to Asia: Nation, Culture and the Problem of Imperial Modernity in Japanese-occupied  
    Java, 1942-1945,” p. 352 
49 G. Kanahele, “The Japanese Occupation of Indonesia,” p. 44 
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Figure 3 – “Peladjaran bahasa Nippon” Japanese 
language lesson , by Asia Raya (September 7, 1944) 
 
Figure 4 – “Peladjaran bahasa Nippon” Japanese 
language lesson, by Asia Raya (1944) 
 
Figure 5 –  “ニッポンゴデハナシマセウ” Let’s speak in 
Japanese , by Desain Grafis Indonesia 
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Therefore good communication was indeed a necessity, as the words of Ichiki Tatsuo already 
explained, and for good communication Indonesian writers, poets and journalists were indispensible. 
Because of the new level of importance they would enjoy, many were eager to cooperate, 50 albeit not 
always according to how the Japanese administration might have imagined:  the Indonesian-language 
newspaper Asia Raya (literally: Greater Asia) was supposed to be a means to promote Japanese-
Indonesian cooperation and mutual comprehension, as it was a means of conveying Japanese 
propaganda. For a large part, however, the newspaper was an Indonesian project, comprised of 
cooperator and non-cooperator segments of the nationalist movement. These journalists were 
convinced that there was a possibility that Indonesian nationalism and Japanese ideals for a Greater 
Asia could be unified.51 Advertisements in the Asia Raya were even the most important source of 
revenue for the nationalist Tiga-A Movement52 that will be discussed in more detail below. 
Asia Raya was based upon the notion of shared Asian interest – instead of using force, the propaganda 
division achieved its goals through a small group of Indonesian representatives, but in the end these 
people were largely left without interference. The newspaper was not controlled very strictly and the 
staff was all Indonesian that possessed relatively autonomous. A reason for this was the existing 
language barrier.53 In this case, the fact that “relations between Japan and Indonesia will always 
remain difficult” if one does not speak the other language, applies the other way around: many 
Japanese did not speak Indonesian, making censorship rather difficult. 
According to Japanese censorship, all forms of public writing and expression had to be submitted to 
the broadcast unit of the propaganda division, but this unit too was submitted to the language barrier, 
resulting in Indonesian staff to do the censoring. In this light it is no surprise that this unit turned a 
sympathetic eye to Indonesian nationalism from time to time, resulting in the fact that Indonesian 
journalists had a limited sense of autonomy.54 
Making bahasa Indonesia and Japanese both official languages coincided with various difficulties. The 
Jawa Nenkan – a yearbook about Java by the military administration – recorded that in various places 
Javanese was still very widely spoken and that bahasa Indonesia was still not the universal language. 
This was for a large part due to lack of proper education which was problematic for Japanese 
propaganda efforts, because this means that a large part of the population could not understand it. 
Other problems were the fact that the literacy among the Indonesian population was below 10 
percent,5556 and that the Japanese language lessons evoked negative reactions. A solution for this 
language barrier is a set of drawings forming a story, like a film script. Figure 8 is one of these drawings.  
 
 
                                                            
50 G. Kanahele, “The Japanese Occupation of Indonesia,” p. 44 
51 E. Mark, “Appealing to Asia: Nation, Culture and the Problem of Imperial Modernity in Japanese-occupied  
    Java, 1942-1945,” p. 313-314 
52 S. Satō, War, Nationalism and Peasants: Java Under the Japanese Occupation 1942-1945, p. 41 
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These stories would be mostly about how heroic the Japanese armed forces were and the role of 
Japan in the Greater East Asian empire, but also about how Indonesian men could sign up for auxiliary 
forces.57  
For the Indonesian nationalists the language barrier that existed with the Japanese authorities turned 
out to be beneficial because they enjoyed a sense of editorial freedom. Furthermore the words 
‘Indonesia’ and ‘Indonesian’ could be frequently used in publications, confirming the existence of an 
Indonesia every day and despite the low literacy rates, Asia Raya was already circulated 23.000 times 
in the first two weeks, which was considerable compared to earlier newspapers circulating in Java.58 
Audio-visual Media 
Out of all different propaganda media, movies seem to have had the most impact on society in general, 
but especially on rural society. The sendenbu took over every existing movie company so that movies 
were now produced by the Nippon Eigasha (Japan Movie Company). Movies from America and other 
enemy countries were banned, so movies had to be imported from Japan.59 Kurasawa writes that 
usually before a movie was screened or a play was about to start, an official from the propaganda 
division or a prominent local leader would give a speech – free admission to plays and movies could 
attract an enormous audience, and also reach the illiterate population. In the play or movie itself too, 
propaganda messages were subtly hidden; 60 movies could not show western influenced individualistic 
ideas or frivolous behavior, but instead had to emphasize the Japanese spirit and Asian values, and 
take a positive role in educating the population in order to discourage Westernization.61  The audience 
did not mind this in their craving for amusement amidst the war.62  All Japanese films that were 
screened on Java were mostly in bahasa Indonesia, the Indonesian language. This contributed to the 
development of a national feeling during the occupation, according to Frans Nieuwenhof.63 As stated 
earlier, however, bahasa Indonesia was still not the universal language on the archipelago so the 
movies might not be understood by the whole population, but rather serve as amusement only.   
One of the most interesting films the Japanese government made during the Japanese occupation of 
Indonesia, according to David Desser, is the film Ahen Sensō (Opium War) dating from 1943.64 It was 
part of the on-going justification for the Japanese war effort and expressively anti-British so it fits right 
in with all the “common-enemy” type of propaganda. According to Desser, Ahen Sensō was intended 
for Japan to show that they are indeed “anti-imperialist saviors” of their newly conquered Asian 
lands.65  An Indonesian version of Ahen Sensō (Perang Tjandoe) was distributed all over Java in 
December 1943 and reviewed in the magazine Djawa Baroe (no.24).66  On the other hand, many 
thought the film to resemble Hollywood Orientalism because of its stereotypical representation of 
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Chinese history and because it made us of Western music and film style; 67 the plot is even derived 
from the Hollywood film Orphans of the Storm. Therefore the propaganda value was little.68 
Additionally, as David Desser states in his article, using parts of a Hollywood film in propaganda reveals 
that the Japanese liked and respected at least something about America. The fact that Britain was 
more often the target of anti-enemy propaganda adds to this argument, according to Desser, and 
could even say something about Japan’s fear and respect for the US military.69  
Ahen Sensō is, of course, not the only movie reflecting recurring propaganda themes: an example of a 
Japanese movie reflecting the earlier mentioned ‘Asian Values’ self-sacrifice and discipline is shown in 
figure 6. The subtitles “offering the soul for mutual safety,” must refer to the Japanese soldier who is 
willing to defy the oedara berbisa or toxic air. The screening date is presented in roman Japanese, 
hachigatsu, or August, which is part of instilling the population with the Japanese language as 
discussed above. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Aside from movies, theatre plays were another way to influence an audience. Anthony Reid, in 
Southeast Asia under the Japanese Occupation, mentions two plays with recognizable themes. The 
first one is Momotaro, portraying Japan, who is fighting off the ‘evil West.’ On the way he meets the 
personifications of China, Philippines and Indonesia, who are suffering and want to help him fight the 
enemy. Secondly, he describes a play about two Indonesian friends of which one is imprisoned due to 
nationalist writing. He undergoes terrible torture, but has enough strength and courage to tell the 
enemy that they can never build anything like Borobudur and that they have reduced literacy with as 
much as 40 percent, making them look bad and inferior. In the end he dies a hero, while his friend 
joined the Dutch police and dies as a traitor.70 The first one shows the recurring theme of propaganda 
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Figure 6 – “Oedara Berbisa,” by Asia Raya (1944) 
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against the West, while the other play shows anti-West propaganda and two of the old values 
mentioned above: self-sacrifice and discipline.  
Just like shown in this last play where Borobudur was mentioned in the sense that the West could 
never have something so great, ancient ‘Indonesian’ history – so dating back from before colonization 
– became glorified in order to encourage anti-West sentiment. Aside from plays, this also manifested 
itself in songs about Majapahit and Srivijaya, both great ancient kingdoms located in what is now 
Indonesia. Likewise, national heroes like Diponegoro, who was the leader of an extensive rebellion 
against Dutch occupiers, were being honored in plays and dances; the Japanese encouraged stories 
about the ‘Indonesian people’ fighting against the Dutch.71In doing so, the idea of the pre-existence of 
an Indonesian nation was created or reinforced.  
Besides the entertaining theatre and movies, newsreels were also used to convey information, such as 
the Emperor’s Birthday.72 Before a movie would start, in large cities even throughout the day, a short 
overview of current affairs would be shown. The Nederlands Instituut voor Beeld en Geluid has a small 
collection of these newsreels in their archive. One of the newsreels, dating back to September 1943, is 
from Nampo Hodo or ‘news of the south,’ produced by Nippon Eigasha. Although Japan was struggling 
in the war, the newsreel shows large groups training marines and a simulated fight for 10 minutes long 
to convince the audience that the war was going well for Japan, contrary to reality.73  
After 1943, the main subject of film (and propaganda in general) switched from ideological & moral 
propaganda to protection, promoting food production, and recruitment of volunteers to aid the 
Japanese Army due to big losses in the war.74 A later Nampo Hodo newsreel from January 1, 1944, 75 is 
an example of this. The film encourages people to become volunteers for the sake of ‘their own 
country,’ thereby stimulating the idea of the existence of an Indonesian country. The volunteers are 
depicted collectively working on a military airbase while singing motivating songs. 
The film starts with a speech by aforementioned nationalist Oto Iskandar di Nata, who was a 
prominent fighter for Indonesia’s liberation from the Dutch. Sukarno and Hatta are also present in a 
march that follows. As discussed above, the Japanese encouraged such fighters for independence and 
national heroes to appear on stage, in favor of their anti-West propaganda. On the flipside, showing 
national heroes all over the country and thereby connecting them with the masses also stimulates 
national consciousness; people could identify with them as being people of the same kind, making 
them part of one nation. In this sense, using nationalist leaders was ambiguous and working in two 
ways.  
One of the sendenbu officials has said that Sukarno actually used them to promote his own 
nationalism and was never tied to his superiors,76 but in this case it is hard to find out if Sukarno 
voiced his own nationalism in his speeches or the Japanese version of it, since both cases are 
Indonesian nationalism. To quote Frank Nieuwenhuis: “Japan inadvertently stimulated Indonesian 
nationalism, although their intent was selfish.”77  
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Theories exist that the Japanese authorities thought that Sukarno’s speeches were full of praise for the 
Japanese; about how bad the West was, and that they would encourage the people to support 
Japanese war effort. After an examination of these speeches, about 75% turned out to be pure 
nationalism. In the speeches Sukarno would use a lot of subtleties and double talk that the masses – 
especially Javanese – would be able to pick up, but the Japanese would not.78 However, Indonesians at 
the time did not agree with this theory and scholars afterwards did not either. 
Because of a shortage of bigger commercial movie theatres, there existed moving theater teams who 
were in charge of outdoor movie projections so that in rural areas people were also able to enjoy 
movies and the included propaganda. The sendenbu knew how important audio-visual mass media 
was to acquire the people’s cooperation, so therefore they tried to promote the people’s access to it. 
This was also the case for radio broadcasting.79 
Radio 
After the surrender of Dutch-Indies military forces on the 8th of March 1942, the sendenbu repaired 
the existing Dutch radio transmitters and took over radio broadcasting. 80  They put a lot of effort in 
building up the radio network in Indonesia. A large public was able to receive radio broadcasts through 
“singing-towers,” that were set up in certain points throughout cities. To reach the biggest possible 
audience through radio, public receivers were installed in streets, in parks and in markets81  and there 
were certain times throughout the day on which people were required to listen to official broadcasts 
that often included speeches by Sukarno.82  
On the 1st of October that year a special department for radio control was brought into life, the Jawa 
Hōsō Kanrikyoku, which was under control of the N.H.K. (Nippon Hōsōkyokai, the Japanese 
broadcasting corporation). The radio broadcasting mainly focused on the midland of Java and had an 
Indonesian as well as a Japanese section.83 The Japanese broadcasts focused on news from the 
homeland (rebroadcasts from the N.H.K.). The Indonesian component, basically like all other forms of 
media, focused on teaching the native people about the ideology of a Great Asia, why Japan had to 
win the war but also about Japanese language and culture. A day-long radio broadcast-schedule shows 
that the news, speeches included, was broadcasted in Indonesian, Javanese, Sundanese and Japanese 
for those learning the language – at certain times during the day there were Japanese lessons 
broadcasted to. That means that Sukarno’s and other nationalist’s speeches could be understood by 
most of the Indonesian population and that the propaganda authority was concerned with giving the 
biggest audience possible access to the government’s intentions.84 During Dutch colonial times, 
Indonesian nationalist leaders never had a chance to convey messages directly to the people, so now 
that they could it must have made a great impact to the audience.85  
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Aside from political broadcasting, there were also a broadcasting-programs focusing on entertainment. 
These programs played traditional Indonesian and Javanese music (keroncong and gamelan) and 
wajang as a radio show.86 Propaganda songs were continuously sung – comparable to commercials on 
TV nowadays – and used in broadcasts or as background music for films. These kinds of songs would 
be about fighting and working spirit (not unlike the song published in the newspaper as seen in figure 
2), a Greater Asia, praising national heroes and the like. Although the effect of radio broadcasts was 
not as striking as visual propaganda, the effect was definitely widespread and reached a larger 
audience at one time with low cost and labor.87 Even so, not everyone was happy with the Japanese 
propaganda broadcasting: 
 “When the Japanese broadcast music in Java, many people would listen, but 
when propaganda commenced, some walked away saying ‘Nihon-Bogong’ (Japan-
lies)”88  
Furthermore the influence of radio was geographically limited.89 Historians like Nugroho Notosusanto 
and George McTurnan Kahin hold the opinion that through radio, important nationalist speeches by, 
for example, Sukarno, were broadcasted and  made available in almost every city and village and in 
multiple languages too. Therefore they state that these speeches would reach a great amount of 
people nationwide.9091  Many villages, however, had no electricity and therefore no radio. Only in a few 
large cities along main streets and in public places radios were installed. Additionally, in time certain 
radios broke down and were never repaired.92 As a result, the propaganda staff discovered that a lot 
of people – even relatively high educated school teachers – did not know who Sukarno and Hatta were, 
or only after Indonesian Independence.93 But contrary to film, radio broadcasts were in multiple 
languages, so more people were able to understand what was being said. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                            
86 L.F. Jansen, In deze halve Gevangenis, p. xix-xx 
87 A. Kurasawa, “Propaganda Media on Java under the Japanese 1942-1945,” p. 89 
88 Ibid, p. 93 
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A Common Enemy and the Creation of a Nation 
In this subsection, more propaganda in printed media will be discussed, such as leaflets and magazine 
and newspaper material. Furthermore a frequently recurring propaganda theme will be discussed in 
more detail, which is the creation of a common enemy of Indonesia and Japan, and how this 
contributed to the development of a national consciousness. Additionally, the creation or 
development of the idea of a (pre-existing) Indonesian nation in media will be discussed as well as 
aspects reinforcing national identity such as a national anthem, flag and dress. 
 Print Media  
Even though paper was scarce and expensive, enough time and effort was put into print media.94 In 
1940, as state control over media intensified, magazines and newspapers had to merge, resulting into 
less publications and therefore less space for cartoonists and authors to make publications. This was 
especially the case for comics and propaganda leaflets targeting enemy troops as well as the Asian 
populace.95 In spite of this, the idea that propaganda was a means to an end still prevailed so a lot of 
effort was still put into the production of print media. 
Beginning in 1940, the Japanese military started producing many propaganda cartoon leaflets and 
illustrations, meant for the Asian populace and enemy troops. The ones aimed at the Asian populace 
were used to evoke antagonism of the people toward the Allied powers during the Pacific War that 
started in 1941.96 The illustrations below are examples of such propaganda. Figure 7 belongs to the 
leaflet-category. It depicts a British soldier who has finished at least one bottle of alcohol, while in the 
background Indonesian Muslims are seen praying. The text above this leaflet says SETAN which is 
equal to Satan or the devil. The fact that the word devil has been used indicates that this leaflet was 
especially targeting the Muslim population of Indonesia, since drinking alcohol is forbidden in Islam 
making this British man an infidel – or in this case the devil. 
Next, in figure 8, a large crowd consisting of Indonesian men is depicted cheering and holding the 
Japanese hinomaru flag. Next to the crowd is the reason why they are cheering; knives have been 
stuck into both the American as the English flag, indicating a certain defeat or a wish for defeat. Figure 
8, instead of being a leaflet, is part of a series of illustrations produced by the propaganda division. 
When personnel from the propaganda division would visit desa (villages in the countryside) these 
illustrations were shown. This is an indication of the need for visual propaganda – especially on the 
countryside - since no text is being used whatsoever, the images speak for themselves.  
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The Djawa Baroe published a good example of the use of common enemy-propaganda and at the 
same time encouraging a national identity. The story is about a part of Balinese history: between 2566 
and 2568 (1906 and 1908) the Dutch invaded kingdoms of Bali that were still independent, Badung, 
Tabanan and Klungkung, to seal Dutch control on the island of Bali. The preface of the story, visible in 
figure 9, introduces the Dutch as a European race that was looking for colonies for the sake of their 
trade, industry and capital. The history of the loss these last Balinese kingdoms is portrayed as a fight 
of the “Indonesian nation” (bangsa Indonesia) against the Dutch: a struggle that shows the desire of a 
nation to defend its independence (perlawananjang menoendjukkan soenggoeh-soenggoeh hasrat 
soeatoe bangsa oentoek mempertahankan kemerdekaannja). That is to say, this part of history of the 
kingdoms of Bali is framed as one of the Indonesian nation and therefore also suggesting and 
reinforcing the existence of an Indonesian identity.  
Figure 7 – “The West as  the devil,” by psywarrior 
Figure 8 – “The West as Common Enemy,” by Nederlands Instituut voor 
Oorlogs-, Holocaust-, en Genocidestudies 
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    Figure 9 – “Poepoetan, the downfall of Balinese kingdoms,” in Djawa Baroe no. 24 (December 1944) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 10 – “I Gusti Bagus Jelantik, Balinese King,” Djawa 
Baroe (1943) 
Figure 11 – Sukarno and Tojo in Batavia  (7th July, 1943), 
by Nederlands Instituut voor Oorlogs-, Holocaust-, en 
Genocidestudies 
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The conjuring and reinforcement of the notion of a pre-existing Indonesia, such as in the story above 
in which is suggested that the Balinese kingdoms were part of an Indonesian nation fighting for 
independence from the Dutch, was enhanced by the inclusion of a daily ‘Indonesia’ heading in Asia 
Raya’s news pages. These news briefs usually came from Java, but they also included stories from 
other places on the archipelago if available. The construction of ‘Indonesia’ had been underway in the 
nationalist press for a while, but this was the first time that an official, government-approved 
publication spoke in these terms in the Indonesian language itself. 97 The use of the words Indonesia 
and Indonesians were critically important to the existence of Indonesia itself too – by using these 
words, its existence appeared as a certainty, even though its future was not certain yet.98  
Noteworthy is the fact that in a lot of this common enemy-propaganda, the ‘enemy’ is England and 
the US, and not necessarily the Netherlands. A possible explanation is the fact that both these 
countries had a bigger role in the war Japan was waging. Therefore, since one goal of the propaganda 
activities was to convince Indonesians Japan had to win the war for their own benefit, the Indonesians 
had to be convinced that these countries were their biggest enemies as well, rather than the Dutch.  
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Flag & Anthem 
Not unlike other colonized nations, the Indonesian archipelago did not have an official flag until their 
day of independence, even though there already was a flag designed in 1922 by the Indonesian Union, 
a nationalist organization of Indonesian students. This flag was also adopted by the Indonesian 
Nationalist Party later in 1928. When looking at figure 12 below, almost all nations are represented by 
their national flags, but in Indonesia only the Japanese flag is visible. When Indonesia was invaded, the 
Indonesian and Japanese flags were both seen everywhere, but a mere twelve days after “liberation” 
from the Dutch, the Indonesian flag was already abolished – the Japanese flag could be used on formal 
occasions instead.99  
The national anthem went through a similar event. Ethan Mark mentions an Indonesian nationalist 
associate, Yusuf Hasan, who became a spokesman in Radio Tokyo’s prewar and wartime Malay-
Indonesian language broadcasts to the Indies that were listened to by many Indonesians who had 
access to radio. His radiobroadcasts would be opened by Indonesia Raya, the anthem of the 
Indonesian nationalists.100 Likewise, just before the attack on Pearl Harbor in 1941 the Japanese 
authorities broadcasted Indonesia Raya and rhetoric about Asia for the Asians on the radio.101 There 
was still hope that it was possible to unite Japanese ideas of a Greater East Asia with Indonesian 
nationalism. This is visible in a broadcast by Hasan from March 26th, 1942: 
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“Brothers of the same race and fatherland! It is now almost four months that 
we have continued to shout and give speeches before this microphone, in the aim 
that our people in general will better realize, be more aware of, and also work even 
harder for, the fatherland. As you hear, our national anthem Indonesia Raya can be 
heard every night from Tokyo. Tonight we expressly offer to the people of Indonesia a 
speech […] which we have expressly entitles “The power and strength of the people is 
an important tool for achieving Indonesian independence.”102 
Together with the red and white flag, the anthem would be banned soon after this broadcast. This 
caused great disappointment among the Indonesian people, especially because in a speech by Prime 
Minister Tōjō Hideki from January 22nd 1942, independence was promised in short order.103 The 
banning of the Indonesian anthem and flag, together with a ban on discussing Indonesia’s future 
political status on the 20th of March and the Japanese design of a Greater Asia instead, were all 
reasons for concern.104 On the other hand, for some people (followers of Greater Asianism and elite 
nation-builders) the ban of Indonesian flags also meant Japanese victory and a collapse of the former 
Western order, paving the way for new Asian opportunities. 105 
During the formation of the Poetera movement, as will be discussed below in more detail, nationalist 
leaders Sukarno and Hatta tried to implement the flag and anthem again, but their requests were 
denied. Only after Prime Minister Koiso declared future independence in 1944, the red and white flag 
and Indonesia Raya became obligatory on every public occasion. The visibility and meaning of them 
had become more significant – especially for the uneducated and illiterate – than any ideological 
rhetoric.106 On the exact day of Koiso’s declaration, the Asia Raya immediately published the 
Indonesian anthem that had been abolished before, although it was still not acknowledged as national 
anthem but rather as a popular song.  From that day up until the actual independence on August 17th 
1945, many items were published in Asia Raya and other media related to the independence that was 
promised to come. Now such content was approved of by the Japanese, making it easier to publish 
and spread nationalist ideas throughout the archipelago.     
 
                                                            
102 E. Mark, “Appealing to Asia: Nation, Culture and the Problem of Imperial Modernity in Japanese-occupied  
    Java, 1942-1945,” p. 55-56 
103 Ibid, p. 56 
104 Ibid, p. 258 
105 Ibid, p. 259 
106 F. Dhont, “Outlasting Colonialism: Socio-Political Change in the Javanese Principalities under the Japanese  
    Occupation of Indonesia during World War II,” p. 91 
25 
 
. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
Figure 13 – Hoisting the Flag in front of the building of 
the Japanese Military Government Advisory Board in 
Jakarta, by Asia Raya (May 28, 1945)   
Figure 14 – “Indonesia Raja” Great Indonesia, by Asia 
Raya (September 8, 1944) 
Figure 15 – “Under the National Flag – Fight with Japan for an Independent 
Indonesia!” (1944), by Nederlands Instituut voor Oorlogs- Holocaust en 
Genocidestudies 
26 
 
National Dress 
As Ikeya shows in her article through an example of modern Burmese women, clothing plays an 
important role in shaping national identity.107 For leaflets dropped in Southeast Asia and India, 
nationality was portrayed through ‘typical’ national costume.108 For example, in figure 8 shown above, 
the crowd appears to be wearing a peci or songkok, which is also visible in figure 11 and 16 where it is 
worn by Indonesian political leaders. This is a cap associated with Malay culture and mostly worn by 
Muslim men. In audiovisual material, Sukarno is always seen wearing such a cap. Figure 10 above, the 
image of the Balinese king, is an example of traditional dress. Even though the example is a regional 
one, the accompanying text (shown in figure 9) speaks to the whole Indonesian nation through their 
common history of fighting against the Dutch – in this way, such traditional culture can associated 
with on a national level and not just on a regional level.  
Likewise, there are also many illustrations in which Malay men wear sarong, and for example Burmese 
men longi, which is not surprising but can be seen as confirming and emphasizing national dress and 
therefore national identity.  Figure 16 below is a good representation of the idea that national clothes 
are part of national identity; every nation is depicted in their own outfit – in this case some wear their 
national military outfits instead of the traditional one, but it still reflects the aspect of reinforcing 
national identity. Another point this image tries to convey is how good it is to be one Great East Asia 
as the text also indicates: it says that the people of East Asia will destroy America and Britain by 
uniting – they will study their hardest and spread their superior culture over the world. “Our hearts 
are one.”  
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Propaganda through Nationalist Movements 
This subsection will discuss three important nationalist movements that have existed throughout the 
period of the occupation and their relation with the propaganda division and if this relation was 
beneficial for the development of nationalist consciousness.  
Pergerakan Tiga A 
Aside from media, the Japanese authorities also tried to propagate their ideas through nationalist 
movements that were in part under their control. The promise of independence for Indonesia and 
stimulating nationalism played an important role in Japanese propaganda on Java. The words from the 
last commander of the 16th army commander, Yamamoto Moichiro, show how Japanese stood 
regarding independence-propaganda: 
“When we look at the Indonesian independence movement during the 
Japanese occupation, it is quite easy to conclude that the Japanese government 
intended to grant the Indonesians their independence very early after the invasion. 
This misunderstanding follows from a superficial assessment of Japanese propaganda 
before the landing operations. In this propaganda we described the prospects of the 
liberation of Asia […] The consequence was a continuous friction between radical 
nationalists and the 16th army.” 109 
On March 20, 1942, Japan issued a new law declaring that “all sorts of discussion, actions, suggestions 
or propaganda” 110 or political activities against all matters of state would be forbidden. The Japanese 
tried to secure cooperation of nationalists through participation within or outside of the 
administration, as journalists, for example, like stated above. However, the ban on political activity 
caused political tensions among both nationalists and the whole Indonesian population. This seemed 
to have caused some concern among the authorities – how could they reduce these tensions? An 
answer was found within both Indonesian nationalism and Japanese propaganda.111 
At first the propaganda division planned to spend a lot of time, staff and material on an extensive anti-
Dutch campaign in an attempt to use anti-colonialism for the purpose of mass mobilization.112 
However the Dutch were quick to surrender before the plan could be carried out. Now left with a lot 
of time on their hands and tension still in the air, the first Indonesian political movement, guided and 
organized by the Japanese propaganda division, was brought to life:  the Pergerakan Tiga A, also 
known as Tiga A  or Triple A movement.113 This movement was also connected with the Islamic 
unification movement (Persiapan Persatuan Ummat Islam). 114  Through the Tiga-A movement, the 
Japanese sought to ease tensions, initially on the propaganda front through – for example – speeches 
given by nationalists in favor of the Japanese war effort on the radio.   
The leaders of this movement were Raden Samsudin and Shimizu Hitoshi. Samsudin was a former 
member of Parindra (Partai Indonesia Raya) – a nationalist political party in the Netherlands Indies 
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that aimed to achieve their goals by cooperation with the Dutch. After losing faith in this cooperation,  
many members of Parindra including Samsudin started to believe the Japanese ‘Asia for the Asians’ 
propaganda and wanted to try and promote their nationalist ideas in cooperation with the Japanese 
authorities instead.115 Hitoshi was the head of the Japanese propaganda section.116  Aside from 
Samsudin, many prominent nationalist leaders seemed to be reluctant in joining the movement 
because some (like Mohammad Hatta) believed it to be a cheap propaganda exhibition, but also 
because some were simply not available at the time, sometimes due to imprisonment. 117 
Advertisements in the Asia Raya were the most important source of revenue for the headquarters of 
the nationalist movement,118 aside from funding from the propaganda corps.119 The Triple A 
Movement stood for three slogans that were first seen printed in the newspaper Sekidōhō, directed at 
Japanese readers, and later on posters in Indonesian as well as Japanese as seen in figure 17 below: 
Japanese   Indonesian   English     
Ajia no Hikari Nippon   Tjahaja Asia Nippon  Japan, Light of Asia 
Ajia no Botai Nippon   Pelindoeng Asia Nippon  Japan, Mother/Protector of Asia 
Ajia no Shidōsha Nippon  Pemimpin Asia Nippon  Japan, Leader of Asia 
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Figure 17 – “Triple A Movement,” by Nederlands Instituut voor Oorlogs-, 
Holocaust-, en Genocidestudies (1942) 
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The movement, however, did not turn out to be a success.120 The Japanese and Indonesian leaders of 
the movement unsurprisingly differed in ideas about the purpose of the movement, which can even 
be seen when translating one of the slogans ‘ajia no botai nippon’. The Japanese word botai 母体 can 
be translated as ‘base’ or ‘parent organization’. The Indonesian word used instead of botai, pelindoeng, 
could be better translated as ‘protector’ or ‘shield’. So the Japanese version of the slogan would 
translate to “Japan, the base of Asia” while the Indonesian version would mean “Japan, protector of 
Asia.”  
Additionally, as stated above, the absence of more prominent leaders was a cause of failure121 and 
even though Samsudin was cooperating with the Japanese propaganda division, he called Indonesia 
‘tanah toempah darah kita Indonesia’ (our homeland Indonesia) in a radio speech on April 21 (1942), 
which was meant to provoke nationalist sentiment. This was not well received by the Japanese 
authorities:122 after Samsudin’s speech concerns rose about the Indonesian name of the movement. 
The word pergerakan (literally ‘movement’) in the Netherlands Indies referred to nationalist 
movements defying colonial authorities, 123 or in other words the general struggle of all groups to 
achieve independence for Indonesia.124 Machida Keiji who was head of the propaganda corps wrote in 
the Sekidōhō that it should be remembered that the movement was originally meant to be the 
“Emperor’s World Movement,” and was aware of the possible dangers attached to the use of the 
word pergerakan. 125 
The complex part of this movement is that the Japanese wanted to make use of the anti-(western) 
colonial sentiment that was part of the Triple A Movement, but at the same time they were afraid that 
these same anti-colonial feelings would turn against them.126 Among the population the movement 
did not have much support either: the total membership of the Tiga A Movement somewhat 
exceeded 4.000, mainly by young Indonesians through its sponsorship of athletic events, making it a 
relatively small movement.127 Satō wrote that according to most historians the Tiga A movement was 
being called “a childish and disorganized campaign characterized by streams of empty words, parades 
and waving of flags or as a comedy written by the propaganda corps and acted by Indonesians,” in 
short not a success.128  
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Poetera 
After a few months the Tiga A Movement fell apart. In March 1943 a new mass movement, Poetera, 
was organized with, surprisingly, many similarities to the Tiga A Movement.129 This time, however, 
prominent nationalists such as Sukarno and Hatta were present. Poetera is short for Poesat Tenaga 
Rakjat, meaning the concentration of people’s power. The Japanese military administration formed 
this movement in part to secure cooperation from the Indonesian people, and in part to relieve 
discontent among nationalists: they believed it would be safer to let the Indonesian nationalists 
participate than to let them do nothing and leave space for them to possibly create underground 
activities or movements.130  However, three months after its creation Hatta had already called the 
organization’s performance “completely unsatisfactory.”131 
Causes for Poetera’s failure were, in the first place differences in goals from the Japanese and the 
Indonesian side leading to animosity. 132 Contrary to Samsudin who was appointed leader from the 
Tiga A movement, both Sukarno and Hatta were very persistent during negotiations with the Japanese 
authorities and they made it very clear that they were aiming at a nationalist movement, focusing on 
the idea of ‘Indonesia.’ In that case they would have a powerful political base in case of political 
change. The idea of ‘Indonesia’ included the use of ‘Indonesia Raya’ as anthem, the use of the 
Indonesian red and white flag and the use of the word Indonesia.133  
The Japanese authorities saw new possibilities for total mobilization in this movement. They wanted a 
new movement to use the population’s anti- (Western) colonial feelings combined with the influence 
that the participating nationalist leaders had, in order to exercise influence over the population in 
favor of their cause: a powerful new Java as an essential part of the Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity 
Sphere. Sukarno and Hatta’s idea of ‘Indonesia’ was therefore impossible to accept. The use of the 
national flag and anthem, two important national symbols, were also considered to be too 
nationalistic and therefore inappropriate for this movement. As a result of negotiations resulting in 
total compromise from the Indonesian side, Poetera was free of any sign of Indonesian nationalism.134   
The Japanese administration always had a close eye on the movement and the participating 
nationalists never got a chance to organize and lead people on their own and while Poetera’s activities 
commenced, opposition grew stronger. Hatta wrote   
“In concluding our overview of Poetera’s work in the past three months, it 
must be said that its situation has been entirely unsatisfactory. […] The leadership and 
the directors feel that their freedom of action has been extremely limited. […] For the 
people Poetera’s present situation is unsatisfactory since it was previously widely 
believed that Poetera would give leadership to various popular efforts. […] Aside from 
propaganda the people see no concrete results of their activities.[…] If it is only a 
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matter of propaganda, the Sendenbu should be enough. […] What is the use of 
Poetera?” 135 
Soon after this report, the movement was dissolved.136 The differences that existed regarding the 
establishment of this movement and the Japanese ambiguous stance towards Indonesian nationalism 
created fundamental problems for Poetera: on the one had nationalists were welcomed to participate 
in this movement but on the other hand their activities were increasingly restricted to nothing but 
propagating for the Japanese:  
“Although according to the original plans contained in its constitution and 
special regulations Poetera was to have done many things, the government decided, 
after Poetera was under way, that anti-Allied propaganda was to be emphasized. 
With this decision, other efforts were downgraded. Anti-Allied propagandizing was 
accomplished through mass meetings and, with sendenbu help, penetrated into the 
villages. The sendenbu contributed the films, Poetera the speeches.”137 
Although film was welcome entertainment during these difficult times, the speeches were not well 
received due to bad economic circumstances. Important factors for Poetera’s failure were the crises 
that existed in Java at the time: rice shortage, labor problems, and shortage and demoralization of 
Indonesian leadership.138 The nationalists participating in Poetera tried to win people over for their 
cause by conducting mass rallies, radio broadcasts and appealing on people’s nationalist feelings, but 
their influence was geographically very limited.139 As explained earlier in this thesis, radiobroadcasts 
were geographically limited. Furthermore, on propaganda tours to the countryside the speeches that 
were held would be in bahasa Indonesia. However, most peasants spoke Javanese, Sundanese or 
other vernacular languages. Additionally, these propaganda tours were limited to areas where Poetera 
had branch offices. 
In the end, Poetera turned out to be a movement, in part created but not trusted by the Japanese 
authorities and therefore it was decided that it should be dissolved. They wanted nationalists to 
participate but in the end this made them even more cautious and therefore it was placed under 
stricter control than the Tiga-A movement was.140 
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Jawa Hōkōkai 
After Poetera was dissolved, a new mass organization was established to replace it in March, 1944. By 
this time the Japanese felt that war was not going well at all – the economic conditions in Java were 
worsening and the popular morale was low.141 The new movement was called Jawa Hōkōkai or 
Himpoenan Kebaktian Rakjat in Indonesian (Java Public Service Association). This time it would be led 
by the Japanese director of military administration instead of Indonesian nationalists.142 The Jawa 
Hōkōkai included a bureau and an advisory board. Sukarno was appointed director of the Jawa 
Hōkōkai bureau and Hatta vice-president of the advisory board.143 This was a means for limiting the 
movements and advancement of nationalist movements.144 
Its main objective was similar to that of the Tiga-A and Poetera: reinforcing the administrative system 
through a mass organization/total mobilization.145 Unlike Tiga-A and Poetera, however, the Jawa 
Hōkōkai also had a deeper control of the population as its purpose, because the military became 
increasingly dependent on the people’s labor.146  
The organization was not mainly a political one, but a “practical service movement that aimed at 
promoting Japan’s military administration policies and it’s friendship with all inhabitants of Java.” 147 It 
was based on the Japanese concept of hōkō: service to higher authorities. Satō quotes the occupation 
authorities in their explanation of the Jawa Hōkōkai foundation spirit: 
 “Hoko spirit means selfless service to the Sublime and Divine. It is the essence 
of the Japanese spirit which runs throughout Japanese history,  […] it is also to be 
regarded as the quintessence of Oriental Morality in general, which regulates the life 
and language of the people of Java, their pious devotion to God and their sincere 
attitude in everyday life. The great and sacred duty of the people of Java can be 
accomplished only by awakening this spirit and giving an organizational form to it.” 
Because this concept of hōkō was foreign in Java, the Japanese authorities referred more often to the 
more familiar concept of kewajiban (duty). Two of the kewajiban imposed on the people were the 
surrender of their rice and labor to the Japanese authorities. 148 The propaganda division also 
produced a film “Tonarigumi” in which the importance of mutual help in war time through 
neighbourhood associations was emphasized. The Jawa Shinbun reported that the Jawa Hōkōkai 
played a positive part in rice delivery in some residencies, but generally it had become worse and 
reforms did not improve the efficiency of the Japanese military administration.149  
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The Jawa Hōkōkai did not last long; the public opinion of the organization deteriorated at a quick pace. 
Satō writes that an Indonesian advisor to the government reported that the people were increasingly 
ignoring the government’s policies. The main reason for this was the increasing difficulty with which 
the people obtained food and clothing – the distribution of commodities was unfair and the material 
situation of the people had worsened greatly. People felt that the Jawa Hōkōkai was just another 
propaganda trick, just like the Tiga A Movemet and Poetera.150 Furthermore their activities were 
mostly meaningless, because the Jawa Hōkōkai representatives spoke in Indonesian while most 
people did not understand this. Many people who attended their speeches came because they were 
summoned or forced by a special police unit, which was another reason for discontent amongst the 
population.151 As Satō writes: “What could be the use of the speeches of the Jawa Hōkōkai 
representatives who were not familiar with the place and who did not speak the people’s 
language?”152  
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Conclusion  
First of all I would like to emphasize that I have focused on Java, so this conclusion is mainly valid for 
the Java region. In this thesis I have tried to answer the question “Did propaganda media contribute to 
shaping and developing a certain Indonesian identity and a national consciousness during the 
Japanese occupation of Indonesia?” On the one hand, as was the case for Ahen Sensō, the propaganda 
value of what was published was probably not always as high as the Japanese hoped for. Furthermore, 
the geographical reach of propaganda was limited and due to low literacy rates propaganda in text-
form reached a small part of the population. On the other hand, propaganda that did reach its 
audience surely supported the creation and reinforcement of a national identity and Japan 
inadvertently stimulated Indonesian nationalism, although their intent was selfish. 
While under Dutch control the Indonesian population was kept passive, while the Japanese actively 
mobilized the whole population for their war effort – psychologically and physically – through movie 
nights, fixed radio broadcasts and various organizations such as the nationalist movements that were 
discussed. Nationalists like Sukarno were used by the Japanese authorities to unite Japanese and 
Indonesian interests in an attempt to keep the population at ease. By giving Indonesian nationalists 
positions in the press, radio and propaganda field, the authorities also tried to keep them from 
creating underground activities or movements. At the same time, in doing so nationalists were given 
the opportunity, though limited, to spread their ideas through for example newspapers and speeches. 
Furthermore, Japanese propaganda media depicted Indonesia united as one nation with one people 
and the West as one common enemy. This was done through emphasis on national dress, declaring 
bahasa Indonesia one official language of Indonesia, referring to Indonesia as ‘Indonesia’ and 
Indonesian as ‘Indonesian’ in texts and promoting a shared national history. Because Indonesian 
nationalism and Japanese expansionism were driven by differing motivations, but by the same enemy 
– the West and its imperialism – this was a frequently recurring theme in propaganda media as well. 
Additionally the Japanese authorities promised independence quite soon in the occupation period. It 
is likely that these images of a free Indonesia kept lingering in the minds of the people, and that they 
could spark the thought that independence was even possible. In this sense the Indonesian people 
were being united by anti-colonial feelings and a wish for independence. 
In conclusion, by using Indonesian nationalist leaders for their own propaganda purposes, the people 
of Indonesia were subjected to them through radio, photos in newspapers or newsreels – which must 
have had an impact on people living isolated in rural areas. Furthermore they had the opportunity to 
know what was going on in their nation and to become more familiar with what was going on outside 
of their village or city. What’s more is the idea of the existence of an Indonesian nation, sometimes 
with a pre-existing history and tradition, that was that was conveyed in media. In other words, even if 
Japanese propaganda itself was not effective, the people were increasingly receiving information 
about their nation and its leaders through different media. Therefore, even though its reach might 
have been limited, Japanese propaganda media in Indonesia certainly did contribute to the 
development of an Indonesian identity and the national consciousness of the Indonesian population. 
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